8 POWs. was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir. The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control, which serves as the de facto border between the two nations. Directly after the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents; however, documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces. The Indian Army, supported by the Indian Air Force, attacked the Pakistani positions and, with international diplomatic support, eventually forced a Pakistani withdrawal across the Line of Control (LoC).
The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, and posed significant logistical problems for the combating sides. This was the first ground war between the two countries after they had developed nuclear weapons. (India and Pakistan both test-detonated fission devices in May 1998, though the first Indian nuclear test was conducted in 1974.) The conflict led to heightened tensions between the two nations and increased defence spending on the part of India. In Pakistan, the aftermath caused instability to the government and the economy, and on October 12, 1999 a coup d'etat by the military placed army chief Pervez Musharraf in power.

Location
After the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, there had been a long period of relative calm among the two neighbours. But during the 1990s, escalating tensions and conflict with separatists in Kashmir as well as nuclear tests by both countries in 1998 changed the scenario. Despite the belligerent atmosphere, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999 to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmiri issue. However, elements in the Military of Pakistan covertly trained and sent troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of mujahideen, into the Indian territory. The aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian Administered Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Some writers have speculated that the operation's objective may also have been as a retalliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier.

Background
There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan captured several strategic high points in the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir. India responded by first capturing strategic transportation routes, then militarily pushing Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control.

War progress
Because of the extreme winter weather in Kashmir, it was common practice for the Indian and Pakistan Army to abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. That particular spring, the Pakistan Army reoccupied the forward posts before the scheduled time.
In early May 1999, the Pakistan Army decided to occupy the Kargil posts, numbering around 130, and thus control the area. Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions This figure includes troops from Pakistan-administered Kashmir that were involved in the war providing additional artillery support.

Occupation by Pakistan
The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway No. 1 (NH 1) from Leh to Srinagar, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1A (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line of sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1A, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians. The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1A, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war. Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war.

Protection of National Highway No. 1A
Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH 1A, the Indian Army turned to driving the invading force back across the Line of Control, but elected not to pursue forces further into the Pakistani-controlled portion of Kashmir. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favor. Nevertheless, some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks – most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them – which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat. As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line of sight. The Bofors field howitzer (infamous in India due to the Bofors scandal) played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun. It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were introduced. The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar but was limited by the high altitude, which in turn limited bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used. The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft which it attributed to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter which was shot down by Pakistan; Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its territory Following this, the Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the last of these Jihadists in the Drass subsector had been cleared, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Shimla Accord.
Indian territory recovery
Pakistan was criticised by other countries for allowing its paramilitary forces and insurgents to cross the Line of Control.

World opinion
The Kargil War was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media in both nations, especially on the Indian side. Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic journalism in India, the Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on TV, and many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. The conflict became the first "live" war in South Asia that was given such detailed media coverage, often to the extent of drumming up jingoistic feelings. The conflict soon turned into a news propaganda war, with the official press briefings of both nations producing claims and counterclaims. It reached such a stage where an outside observer listening to both Indian as well as Pakistani coverage of this conflict, would wonder whether both sides were reporting on the same conflict. The Indian government placed a temporary news embargo on information from Pakistan, even banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV and blocked access to online editions of Dawn newspaper. The Pakistani media played up this apparent curbing of freedom of the press in India, while the latter claimed it was in the interests of national security. Incidentally, one of the shells fired by Pakistan troops even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil, although coverage continued. and served as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage, helping India to gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position on the issue.

Impact and influence of media
One of the main concerns in the international community during the Kargil crisis was that both neighbours had access to weapons of mass destruction, and if the war intensified, it could have led to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability a year before in 1998; India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test. Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. With the outbreak of clashes in Kashmir just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations took notice of the conflict and desired to end it.
The first hint of the possible use of a nuclear bomb was on May 31 when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal.

WMDs and the nuclear factor

Aftermath
The aftermath of the war saw the rise of the Indian stock market by over 30%. The next Indian national budget included major increases in military spending. From the end of the war until February 2000, the economy of India was bullish. There was a surge in patriotism, with many celebrities pitching in towards the Kargil cause.

India
Faced with the possibility of international isolation, the already fragile Pakistani economy was weakened further. All these factors contributed to a strategic failure for Pakistan in Kargil.

Notes

The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil the CCC Kargil Project.
Kargil Conflict (GlobalSecurity.org)
Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella (RAND Corporation)
War in Kargil (Center for Contemporary Conflict) PDF download
Essay on the outcomes of the Kargil War
Stephen P. Cohen (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1502-1. 
Kargil Review Committee (2000). From Surprise to Reckoning : The Kargil Review Committee Report. SAGE Publications. ISBN 0-7619-9466-1.  (Executive summary of the report, Online)
Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests? Paper by Suba Chandran
An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999, by Shaukat Qadir, RUSI Journal, April 2002 (PDF)